The research is devoted to the analyses of the theoretical and methodological backgrounds of urban planning trends from the perspective of megaprojects (MPs), with specific reference to the Belgrade Waterfront Project (BWP). In analysis we combined a contextually appropriate approach, some elements of the phronetic planning approach and the heuristic approach to planning and development of megaprojects. BWP induced a change of the institutional framework (the introduction of specific legal and policy instruments), as a key source of future changes in the metropolitan tissue. Preliminary impact assessment of the BWP indicates the following: slow development & economic effects, low transparency, social inequalities, marginal social mobilization and weak networks between the key actors, public funds overuse, limitation of government independence in law-making, displacement impacts, high public financial risk, strong urban transformations, environmental impacts, mediumtechnological modernisation, etc. The research highlights the differences in the political, institutional, social and economic environment that shape the BWP. It provides recommendations for future research and application, for a continuing in-depth & sensitivity analysis for managing the undesirable consequences of the BWP, including the determination of the interplay between different pools of powers that are important in urban planning, governance and the implementation of MPs ('from power to tower').
Introduction
Megaprojects are considered as large-scale capital investments focused on a single purpose, and they may also be seen as multi-purpose or "hybrid". They include infrastructure projects (bridges, tunnels, highways, railways, airports, seaports...), energy projects (power plants, dams, oil extraction...), science projects, and aerospace projects. Kennedy et al. (2014) , have classified MPs into: 1) infrastructure for basic services, 2) economic development (by property development and commercial activities), 3) transport infrastructure, and 4) urban redevelopment. Urban megaprojects mainly refer to public buildings, urban infrastructure, large sporting events and, recently, to mixed use waterfront redevelopment. Revitalisation of urban waterfronts is one of the instruments which urban policy makers use to redevelop cities into effective economies. This research is devoted to the analysis of MPs as instruments in the development of post-socialist cities, which are shaped by a mix of economic interests, socio-political and ideological frameworks.
Huge investments and large and diverse risks & impacts of megaprojects have led to a higher interest in the planning and management of megaprojects among researchers (Altshuler and Luberhoff 2003 , Fainstein 2009 , Flyvbjerg 2009 , 2014a , Gellert and Lynch 2003 , Kennedy et al. 2011 . The key studies of megaprojects worldwide (del Cerro Santamaria, 2013 , Flyvbjerg et al. 2003 , Kennedy, 2013 show that the difference between the dominant regions of the global "North-West" 1 and the global "South-East" is not as large as one might think. Megaprojects usually involve "exceptional" forms of governance, and do not go through the normal channels (Kennedy et al. 2014) . The issues of high risks and uncertainty, cost underestimation and overruns, the pressure of ruling elites, low or inadequate public informing, lack of transparency, weak public support, social and environmental impacts are present in a similar manner in countries with different political and institutional systems and level of economic development. Neoliberal globalisation is dominating as, according to Flyvbjerg (2013) , the increasing number of megaprojects is "supported by a mixture of national and supranational government, private capital and development banks".
In post-socialist countries, the change of political system created new power relations between different groups involved in urban development; increased private capital influence by enabling public-private partnerships, and, as Bodnar and Veres (2013) claim, made large-scale urban development even more under-determined than suggested by literature. This paper will analyse the sensitivity of urban research to the discontinuity of conceptual frameworks in a transitional context of the post-socialist city. The research first presents the theoretical backgrounds followed by the key approaches to megaprojects in urban planning, and highlights their role and common features, and, finally, focuses on the experience of the Belgrade Waterfront Project (BWP).
Research objectives and methodology
The key research objectives are the analyses of the theoretical backgrounds of urban planning from the stand-point of the role of megaprojects as an urban development instrument. Furthermore, the research will analyse in detail the BWP and its potential development impacts.
The theory and methodology of urban planning and megaprojects faces complex issues: the social contextualization of urban planning and governance, investment and regulations. Since the 1970s and 1980s, under pressure of globalisation, cities have started economic transformation according to the new "Post-Fordist" development, characterized by the shift from industrialization to different types of high-technology development, management, different services, etc. According to Scott and Storper (2015) , the complexity of the causes of urbanization and the different nature of urban development are linked to the political goals. National and global politics shape the urban theory of global/world cities (Sassen 2008 , Cochrane 2006 , Brenner 1998 , 2004 , Scott and Storper 2015 . Cities can be understood in terms of a theoretical framework that combines the processes of agglomeration/polarization, land uses and human interactions in conditions of the existence of the urban similarities and differences. Castells (1972) , Lefebvre (1970) and Harvey (1973) supported a concept of the city as a theatre of class struggle, centred on land markets as "urban machines" for distribution of wealth, and they have supported citizens' rights to urban space. Urban growth is realised by infrastructure development ('urban growth machine', Molotch 1976). Brenner (1999) , Cochrane (2006) and Harvey (2012) suggested the re-conceptualization of older concerns on urban politics and governance. Harvey (2012) pointed to neoliberal domination on the changing nature of political governance scales (from cities over states to the global level). Kennedy et al. (2014) point to the development of megaprojects as opposed to "economic development policies". In accordance to new political-economic doctrines, the reorganizations on national level gave new inputs for urban governance. Harvey (1989) identified the shift from managerial into entrepreneurial governance, i.e. from the focus on urban services to the promotion of economic growth. These intentions are realized through megadevelopment projects, speculative construction and political economy of place. The hypothesis of "entrepreneurialism" and "state spatial rescaling" are a shift between capital and territory from national to urban scale, which is important for urban megaprojects (Brenner 2004) . Bauman (1998) calls megaprojects "great war on space independence".
Top-down urban planning approach by megaprojects opens research of urban governance, tools for identifying the key actors, their knowledge and interaction. Many researchers point to a top-down approach to planning urban MPs and to the bottom-up public resistance to claiming urban spaces (Flyvbjerg, et al. 2002; Davis and Dewey 2013; Kennedy, et al. 2011 ). Sellers (2002 criticized the central role of international business elites and the influence of external capital on urban-policy making. This is important for preventing conflicts between private and public property, economic interests and social requirements. Swyngedouw (1996) indicates that the state seeks to attract capital through place-based interventions in urban regions. He argued that large urban development projects have "less democratic and more elite-driven priorities". Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) argued that MPs "normally require special authorizing, funding, revenue, land acquisition, and regulatory actions by two or more government levels". Political impulses are very important in the creation of urban MPs. The top-down approach offers no possibilities for democratic negotiations. Hansen (2014) has argued that "...where the prime-minister can control local projects as if he's playing in his own private Lego-land", pointing to the MP in Istanbul.
MPs use multi-governance institutional arrangements because social response is important for their development. According to Kennedy et al. (2014) , decision-making about MPs involves multiple actors with conflicting interests and multi-level governance. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) argued that "citizens are typically kept at a substantial distance from megaproject decision-making".
As instruments of urban planning and development, megaprojects include high-technology, sophisticated and nonstandard technology, contemporary design ('iconic' buildings), and ICT management. MPs are initiated by global economic restructuring and policy-makers, and supported by neoliberal urban development policies, often with transnational financial support by top-political structures.
MPs include substantive changes in the legal, economic and political framework. They have special power and special status, an inherent and "exceptional" nature, and a "special regime" of implementation (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003) . Kennedy et al. (2014) argued that MPs are not always planned in advance, but integrated ex post into planning documents. Policy makers are particularly attracted to MPs (Flyvbjerg 2003) . Mayors often promote the "city renaissance" of a "world class"/"global city" via MPs. MPs represent a mode of urbanisation (Roy 2003) and a 'collateral' instrument against illegal, irregular and informal construction in cities of the 'South'. Flyvbjerg (2009) indicated that a major problem in megaproject policy is misinformation about the costs & benefits, and high risks. The "megaproject paradox"includes risky scenarios, underestimated costs, overestimated benefits and revenues, undervalued environmental impacts, overvalued economic effects (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003) , as well as legal and ethical issues. Flyvbjerg (2014b) argued about the "iron law of megaprojects" -exceeding the budget & time-frame, a lack of accountability, and delays. This situation of underestimating costs and overestimating benefits, and systematically underestimating risks is the so-called "survival of the unfittest", i.e. building the worst projects instead of the best. Flyvbjerg (2009 Flyvbjerg ( , 2013 believes that MPs have a trend to break sooner or later, i.e. that after the "break" projects are reorganized with the attempt to "fix" problems and deliver some version of the planned solution. Megaprojects managed according to the "break-fix" model are "disasters waiting to happen" (Flyvbjerg 2014b ).
Fainstein (2009) claims that "MPs always include a transformation of land uses". Gellert and Lynch (2003) think that "projects transform landscapes….in a very visible way'', and that "MPs require coordinated flows of international finance capital". Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) argue that MPs include a lot of commitments of public resources and contain "threats to some interests and values because key actors promise large benefits to others".
The so-called 'planning fallacy' of the MPs is a phenomenon which includes underestimated costs and the required time, and overestimated effects. It usually implies the invalid or deceptive arguments or misinterpretation of judgement in MPs predictions.
The key challenges, risks and uncertainties in planning MPs are: 1) Structural complexity and complex nature of MPs; 2) External shocks (transition, global economic and financial crisis, economic risks, collapse of real estate markets, public policies, societal impacts, political shifts, weighted average cost of capital, confronted interests of social actors); 3) Stakeholders (their objectives and relationships: waste of time, loss of money and credibility); 4) Governance and its relationship with risk management; 5) Changes of formal contract conditions induce financial, economic or political costs; 6) Fuzzy capabilities of actors involved; 7) Introduction of new legal and financial instruments, etc. In general, it should be emphasized that a number of various risks in MPs ought to be identified, considered and managed.
In analysing the BWP we combined a contextually appropriate approach, some elements of the phronetic planning approach, as well as the heuristic approach to planning megaprojects. These approaches focus on the syncretic forms of urban and development policies and the current discourse analysis in Serbia (Zeković et al. 2015a ).
Case study of the Belgrade Waterfront Project

General description
As a result of a number of exogenous and endogenous factors, there has been a collapse of strategic thinking, research and governance in Serbia for almost three decades. In developmental terms, after the socio-economic growth and development in the 1980s, the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, regional wars, international isolation and sanctions, Serbia's economy collapsed, experiencing only occasional spells of recovery. Serbia is one of the most undeveloped European countries (belonging to the 'inner peripheries of Europe') with miserable development prospects (Vujošević et al. 2010) . The integration into EU is highly questionable, and 'Europeanization' outside the Union with its limited support seems a more plausible future perspective. Under the circumstances of a primitive 'post-socialist/proto-capitalist transition', a poorly developed institutional and democratic culture represents a particularly crippling handicap. Within this, planning has been played down to the role of the 'junior' partner of the market, which is equally underdeveloped. As a result of widespread 'systematic and programmed mobilization of interests and bias', paralleled by corruption, manipulation and clientelism, public discourse on key strategic issues of development has been debilitated and directed to less relevant aims and purposes (Vujošević 2003) . Neoliberal ideological and political mantras (e.g. liberalization, marketisation, deetatisation) dominate the public scene, although recently with a larger number of sceptics concerning the main direction of the institutional and development changes.
In such circumstances, large investments of an already over-indebted country into an expensive elitist megaproject of the inner-city waterfront redevelopment could hardly be expected to receive wide expert and public support. However, the idea of the Belgrade Waterfront megaproject has already been announced to the public and media in April 2012, in The BWP was not planned in advance, but integrated ex post into the Master plan of Belgrade by amendments verified in September 2014, while the Spatial plan of the Belgrade waterfront was adopted in January 2015. However, the BWP has been poorly linked with the long-term goals of the Master plan of Belgrade. It is a Dubaiinspired project of the old city's waterfront redevelopment with little public resistance. Bancroft (2015) argues that the BWP embodies the promise of Belgrade's return to the world stage. In March 2015, the Academy of Serbian architects adopted a Declaration on the BWP, with arguments against the project.
In accordance with the specific ordinance (2006, 2012) , the BWP is verified as a national priority, which illustrates a dominant model of public-private partnership with a national/metropolitan influence, despite the influence of an international private investor. The main legal precondition for the realisation of the BWP was the adoption of a lex specialis -a Law on establishing the public interest and the special procedures of expropriation and issuance of construction permits for the BWP implementation in April 2015. But, from the constitutional point of view it is rather questionable if development of such commercial project could be deemed to be in the public interest even with the enactment of a special law stating it is so (Bojović&Partners 2015). Stakeholders have different interests and norms due to a ''Faustian pact'', which sacrifices anything to satisfy a limitless desire for power (i.e. selling the old urban soul for high towers, shopping malls and luxury flats). Absence of accountability is evident in the BWP decision-making. Monitoring and control systems are insufficient, as well as the approaches for evaluating main social, economic and environmental impacts.
The main goal of the BWP is to activate the great potential of the waterfront and develop a modern urban centre, thus promoting an international image of the city of Belgrade. The key objective of the Belgrade Waterfront Spatial Plan (2015) is to transform a neglected area into a modern city centre -spatially integrated, socially acceptable and economically viable. The general objectives are: 1) Not to disturb the river Sava biodiversity, nor the existing landscape and architectural values; landscape improvement; revitalisation of cultural heritage, while emphasizing the value of the existing building stock; 2) To provide better life quality to all citizens; 3) To create and affirm a globally recognisable tourist destination; 4) To create and affirm a modern commercial offer; 5) To construct infrastructure systems and connect them to major traffic and utility infrastructure. The operational goals of the Project include: flood protection, finalization of a new public transport system (especially railways), regeneration of all infrastructure, protection of cultural heritage, and new places for gathering.
The key outcomes of the Belgrade Waterfront Spatial Plan include: elimination of inadequate content (some existing buildings); connection with the wider territory; contact with river and integration of both Sava river banks; creation of multi-purpose area in the Sava amphitheatre; maintenance of identity, values and spatial potential, especially viewpoints. This represents a potential generator of new urban activities.
Potential development impact of the BWP
The decision-making regarding megaprojects in Serbia is exclusive and elite-driven. This is visible: 1) by innovations in the existing Planning and Construction Act (PCA), 2) by appreciation of the new lex specialis (expropriation for private elite-housing and commercial purposes for the BWP, and its addendum in December 2015), 3) by verification of the megaproject as a national strategic priority (the Ordinance 2006 (the Ordinance , 2012 , and with the possibility for public funding, 4) by property development regulation, 5) local communities are excluded from decision-making and not enough informed about future activities; which opens confrontation, public debates and the possible modification of the plans and projects, 6) citizens do not know whom to trust: politicians, the mayor, bureaucrats, foreign investors, managers, local NGOs or experts. Political leaders and the mayor of Belgrade provide majority of the information regarding the BWP. Dogan (2015) argued that a strong national initiative in this project represents a top-down approach to the regeneration of the wider Savamala district. Eror (2015) argued that ''it's a state-driven model" called "top-down" or "hyper" gentrification.
Megaprojects can serve as catalysts for introducing new policy instruments, as in the case of the BWP -the introduction of a special purpose spatial plan for the megaproject zone in the historical urban core of Belgrade, with a special regime, special project status, the new model of public funding of the project and PPP.
The BWP envisages the construction of two million m² on 177.27 ha: 6,128 flats (one million m²), commercial spaces (a main tower 210m high, a shopping mall, several tall buildings), social, cultural, recreational and free spaces. There are predictions about cleaning the riverfront, old buildings, railway infrastructure, abandoned ships, environmental clean-up, etc. Total investment varies from 3.1 billion EUR to eight billion USD. Implementation of the BWP foresees three phases during the period of 8-30 years, with the engagement of domestic companies and development of new services.
Possible development impacts of the BWP include intensive social impacts (raising social inequalities, gentrification, involuntary resettlement, networking of the key actors), intensive impacts on national level (overuse of public funds, limiting the State in making laws that are incompatible with the BWP interests), displacement effects, high public financial risk, strong urban transformations, intensive demographic growth (17,700 new inhabitants), low development and economic effects, low transparency and public participation, environmental impacts, medium-technological modernisation and others (Table 1) . Policy makers promoted the BWP, emphasizing its role in creating employment, promoting tourism, using domestic inputs, improving productivity, growth competitiveness, high-quality services, etc. Expected employment in the BWP varies from 13,169 to 200,000 employees, with 22,000-25,000 employees in the construction phase. Pre-Feasibility Study, 2012) , no scientific analysis, and no urban study; 3) A discrepancy in choice of institutions included into the evaluation of the urban construction land: according to lex specialis that is fiscal authority, but according to the JVA these are the experts for the real estate assessment; 4) Unclear dynamics of investment, total sum, and agreed (disproportionate) share of the strategic partner in the financing of the buildings in the BWP. Three billion EUR should be invested through a strategic partner, i.e. the buyers of flats and commercial spaces. There is a real risk from the lack of finances (''too little, too late''); 5) The regulatory regime implicates public risks and costs, an inverted order in the preparation of the pre-feasibility study and different appraisals, implementation postponement, and 6) Discrepancies in the Law on accepting the agreement between the governments of the Republic of Serbia and United Arab Emirates with the Constitution (Art. 6 of the Law states that agreements, programmes and projects according to this law are not subject to public tender, while the Constitution in Art. 16 prescribes that international agreements must be in accordance with the Constitution; and in Art. 82 "the economic model in Serbia is based on market economy, open and free market").
The introduction of specific legal and policy instruments in Serbia under neoliberal economic pressures is a key source of the future change in the metropolitan tissue by the BWP. Potentially negative development impacts of the BWP in some legal aspects of the urban construction land might comprise: 1) Leaseholds of public urban land without fees to the subject of the lease -the Company BW (by Decree/Regulation, 2011); 2) Right of lease to the BW Company based on the rent agreement will be converted into the right of ownership (after constructing building/s and one month after obtaining a use-permit); 3) Conversion of the right of leasehold into the right of ownership without any fee, with a primary goal -supporting an ownership over the most expensive urban land "without money" and then selling it; 4) The BW Company can transfer the right of ownership to other parties without a fee. Legal alienation of public urban land without a fee is possible in accordance with different laws (including lex specialis); 5) The obligation of Serbia and the City of Belgrade to finance and build all external and internal capital infrastructure till December 31, 2019 (Art. 9.1.1. of the JVA) -although the prime-minister has claimed that no public money would be spent in the BWP. 6) An enactment of necessary legislation allowing full set-off of all land development fee against public land development costs on the project level. Land development fees covered by the Plan and JVA will be governed by a separate agreement between the City of Belgrade and national institutions. If Serbia does not fulfil contractual obligations, it has to pay damages to the strategic partner; 7) The final calculation of the costs between investors and the City of Belgrade will be made after completing the construction of all planned facilities (Art. 16), but without a stated period when it should be completed (2020-2045); 8) Serbia could not change the BWP plan without the approval of a strategic partner. A partner can change some parts of the plan; 9) Serbia has an obligation to adopt the necessary changes to other laws that are desirable according to the JVA. Serbian government should refrain from amendments to the laws in accordance with the JVA. The JVA can limit the independence of the national government in passing the laws, and 10) a strategic partner will provide loans to Serbia for cleaning locations and infrastructure (130 million EUR) under commercial conditions.
Multiple agents have already appeared in the BWP related to its strategic planning and governance. Project promoters emphasize good governance, transparency and participation, but citizens are mainly excluded from the decision-making (including low level of public informing). The public is sceptic or negative, and the intellectual elite is quiet. The protests of citizens and NGOs, as well as different "guerrilla activities" reflect insufficient transparency and democracy in the planning of the post-socialist urban development by the BWP.
Recommendations for future research and application
In many regions of the "South-East" neoliberalized state policies support urban development compatible with elite tastes and consumption that promotes socio-economic inequalities, thus enabling global finance capital to shape the city (Watson 2012) . This "privatization" of planning, as Shatkin (2011) calls it, through mega-projects tends to undermine the public administration of urban space and replace local authority with private governance. Recent research of mega-projects in cities of the South (Kennedy et al. 2014 ) also showed the decreased significance of local government within the state territorial organisation (local governments usually were not driving the process of economic development).
To overcome these problems, we suggest an alternative approach (to the current practice) in the BWP planning and appraisal process that considers the use of the following instruments: more transparency, real public participation, performance specifications, better regulatory framework with explicit determination of the regime (and elimination of policy risks before decision-making), less use of private international risk capital, compilation of pre-feasibility study and appraisals, public promotion of independent peer-review of the pre-feasibility study, public bid for possible involvement of the private sector in financing the capital city infrastructure, and limitation of the state guarantee in the JVA. Performance specifications include a goal-driven approach in preparation of the feasibility study and decision-making, which is different than the traditional technical-driven approach. This alternative approach is closer to the general context of the countries in the "North-West" and key instruments in their planning systems. The alternative approach should include: a) more transparency in decision-making, with real and wide participation of different stakeholders; greater transparency in decision-making and more public participation are often applied in the "North-West", based on a long tradition of democracy principles in planning, on the one side, and possibility for the active stakeholders' involvement in ''policy re-design'' (as well as in decision-making), on the other. More transparency should imply formulation and evaluation of alternatives, but in the case of the BWP there was no alternative -just one solutioninvestor proposal that was accepted through the (traditional, centralised, technocratic) top-down approach in planning and decision-making. Outdated and often inappropriate in the context of changing urban environments (Watson 2009 ), bureaucratic approaches are still predominantly used in the major part of Global South (UNHabitat 2009). b) performance specifications imply a goal-driven approach in preparation of the feasibility study and decisionmaking, which differs from the traditional technically-driven and top-down approach in decision-making (e.g. in the BWP). In the planning of capital urban projects significant elements are democratic legitimacy (both top-down and bottom-up simultaneously), technical and economic rationality, social and environmental acceptability. The performance specifications should derive from key objectives of policies/plans and public interests. There are significant differences among countries whose planning and legal systems differ (e.g. in Europe differences might arise from common law and European civil law). Traditional technical solution-driven approach in decisionmaking of MPs characterises the Global South-East, but sometimes also appears in the Global North-West''. c) setting better regulatory framework involves elimination of policy risks and/or their inclusion before decisionmaking, as well as abandoning the practice of ignoring risks, underestimating costs and overestimating benefits; d) less use of private international risk capital, with its share of 67% in the BWP (but, not in real funding the BWP); involvement of the private sector in investment and implementation of the project, with avoidance of risk capital; e) the pre-feasibility study is required by national regulative, as well as independent peer-review of the prefeasibility study; f) public bid -in the BWP case there was no public bid for the competition in which other potential bidders could participate with the Republic of Serbia and the City of Belgrade in creation, realisation and common funding of the project; g) limitation of the state guarantees to lenders for funding the private luxury housing and commercial office space, especially in joint project funding with the state/ministry and the City of Belgrade;
Opportunities for improvement exist in all mentioned parts of the alternative approach in the "North-West" and the "South-East", especially regarding more transparency, performance specifications (prioritise a goal-driven approach), and better regulatory regime. Generally, we assume that tools of the alternative approach are mainly used in the regions of "North-West", while traditional instruments predominate in the "South-East", although the differences among them are not as large as many believe.
Recommendations for future research and application in practice are important for continuing an in-depth and sensible analysis, so as to effectively manage the undesirable consequences of the BWP, and for the introduction of more flexible and innovative urban land tools, such as: urban rezoning; tradable development rights; infrastructure finance; regulatory arrangements of the Public-Private-Partnerships in property rights as legal tools (community development agreements, community benefits agreements, planning agreements, re/negotiation, covenants, easements, the concessions); the new financial instruments (low-risk municipal and government bonds, high-risk financial derivatives); reinvestment; land value capture tax (Zeković et al. 2015b ).
The new approach in planning, governing and implementing MPs requires: 1) a more effective, efficient and democratic approach in planning (transparency), as well as multi-disciplinary approaches, 2) an analysis and critique of the conventional approach, 3) a search for a mode to overcome the theoretical and empirical weaknesses of the conventional approach by recognising an acceptable level of public risks, institutional issues and MPs' accountability, 4) analysis of the measures for systematic detection of underestimated project costs, overestimated benefits and ignoring risks (by promoters and developers), 5) the introduction of measures for better policies and planning, changing governance structures and methods, 6) determination of the interplay between the different pools of power that are important in planning, governance and the implementation of MPs, and 7) a new way for efficient public participation of different socio-economic actors and their networking.
Conclusions
The analysis highlights the differences in the political, institutional, social and economic environments that shape the Belgrade Waterfront Project. At the same time, the BWP induced a substantial change of institutional framework (introduction of specific legal and policy instruments) under neoliberal economic pressure, which represents a key source of future changes in the metropolitan tissue. The heuristic assessment of the developmental effects of the BWP especially highlighted the following: intensive social inequalities, marginal social mobilization of the key actors and stakeholders, intensive impacts on national level, high displacement effects, high public financial risks, strong urban transformations, low development effects, low economic effects, low transparency and public participation, environmental impacts, medium-technological modernisation, etc.
We have indicated some alternative recommendations in the process of planning, governance and implementation of MPs, which can support better development effects and result in better outcomes for the city. In the process of planning and appraisal of the BWP, we suggest more transparency, performance specifications, the creation of a better regulatory framework, and less use of private risk capital. The specific objective of the BWP requires specific instruments, including legal, financial, economic, construction, environmental, different standards, and more innovative and flexible urban land instruments significant for megaprojects. However, as Yiftachel (2006) points out, planning and governance in "non-western" and "non-northern" societies should avoid pitfalls of domineering universalism based on material and political settings of "North-West" countries (from which majority of leading theories emerge), but create "meso-level theories which would genuinely engage with the framing realities of various south-eastern regions".
Decentralization of regulation powers is important from the standpoint of planning, decision-making, governance, control, and the implementation of megaprojects. It provides recommendations for future research and application, for a continuing in-depth & sensitivity analysis to manage/mitigate undesirable consequences of the BWP, including determination of the interplay between different pools of powers that are important in urban planning, governance and the implementation of MPs ("from power to tower").
